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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of scholarly effort to define and understand populism, the
concept remains ripe for investigation. Given that conflicting theories concerning
populism's definition, causal origins, and manifestations remain far from resolved,
more effort is needed to make these topics intelligible. Modern investigations of
populism can provide conceptual clarity and also contribute something of value to
social science, especially since comparatively little has been published on populism's
most recent manifestations. As author David Leaman has stated, "we need further
analysis of the last fifteen years' neopopulism" (Leaman, 323-324).
A study of populism with an emphasis on Latin America seems particularly
warranted given the phenomenon's remarkably long existence in the region. Although
many scholars don't establish the advent of populist politics until the 1920s or 1930s
(Seligson, 82), others have hinted that elements of populist ideology existed in Latin
America before the emergence of so-called 'populist' political policies. At least some
of these theories have been normatively critical: Michael Derham, for example, has
labeled populism "Latin America's most enduring political disease" (Derham), and
Ernesto Lac1au has stated that "from the very beginning... [p]opulism has not only
2been demoted: it has also been denigrated" (Laclau, 19). Still, populism has gained
something of a cult following over the past decade.
In more recent years, Bolivian President Evo Morales has been classified as a
populist by media (Bast) as well as academic sources (Seligson). These attributions
are particularly interesting given that some theorists have indicated that populism,
defined in various ways, is incompatible with holding office and Morales assumed the
presidency in 2006. Perhaps Alistair Hennessy states the challenge to populism best
when he says, "[0]nly when populists are in opposition and are not compromised by
the support of a governmental apparatus can they retain the essence oftheir beliefs"
(Hennessy, 52-53). This idea has been seconded by Von Byrne, who states that
populists can only '''keep clean' the purity of their basic creeds" (Von Beyme) when
in opposition.
In the literature on populism, this dilution of populism is typically referred to
as routinization or institutionalization, and it appears loosely related to other theories
of government transitions, primarily those that discuss charismatic leaders l and civil
society. The basic premise of all these theories is that a successful transition into
power changes the political environment in a way that threatens the independent
variable that (arguably) made the transition possible in the first place. Here, it should
be stressed that the terms 'routinzation' and 'institutionalization' are used very
differently among authors depending on the definition of populism being utilized. For
J See The Emergence o/Sociological Theory by Turner, 1. H., L. Beeghley, et al.
3example, some scholars merely imply that populism is less effective once in office
(Conniff, 234) or that it becomes institutionalized (Knight, 231-232) and (Wear).
However, both Hennessy and Von Byrne make it clear that being in power challenges
populist beliefs.
Which is it, then? Can populism survive in office, or is it doomed to weaken?
This thesis utilizes a case study of Morales' presidency to test hypotheses of populist
routinization. After establishing a working definition of populism, it compares a
baseline sample of Morales' pre-presidency discourse to a second sample taken after
his transition to power to determine whether the "essence" of populism has indeed
been compromised. Ultimately, this thesis argues that theories ofroutinzation are
incorrect: although the characteristics of Morales' populism change after assuming
the presidency, his appeals to, and identification with, common sense and ordinary
values actually grow stronger in office.
4CHAPTER II
METHODS
The following section will briefly address the methodological issues that arose during
the conceptual and research phases of this project.
ESTABLISHING A DEFINITION
In order to study populism, one must first define what it is. Ironically, for all
the agreement about the importance of the concept, a myriad of competing definitions
exist. This study will utilize an abstract, middle-range definition of populism that has
been culled from academic writings. Such a definition has been chosen because it
enables scholars to gain conceptual leverage over the topic of populism while still
allowing for regional variations in its manifestations. There is at least some logical
support for this move; as author Alan Knight says, "even a loose label can sometime
prove useful" (Knight, 248). This type of mid-range definition has also been chosen
in an effort to avoid constructing a tautological argument in which a definition of
populism is drawn from a comparison of supposed populist cases in Latin America
and then subsequently reapplied to that region.
At this point, it seems important to distinguish between definitions of
populism, theories of populism, and manifestations of populism, because these are
5often conflated in academic writings. For the purposes of this essay, definitions of
populism attempt to convey the fundamental character of the concept; theories oj
populism attempt to explain why populism occurs (they make assertions about
causality); and manifestations ojpopulism serve as concrete case studies. Because of
the narrow focus of this thesis, only the first of these categories will be directly
addressed.
Historically, there is a precedent for defining populism as a body of ideas or
beliefs. As early as 1969, social scientists acknowledged that "to make sense of
populism we must treat it as though not only as, an ideology" (MacRae, 154). Still,
the seemingly paradoxical nature of populism makes it necessary to qualify the
'populism as an ideology' premise in some way. The primary difficulty in speaking of
populism as an ideology arises from the conceptual dissonance of its many
manifestations. As Taggart explains, "[p]opulism has been a tool of progressives, of
reactionaries, of democrats, of autocrats, of the left and of the right" (Taggart, 4). The
juxtaposition of fascist populist manifestations and socialist populist manifestations
has perplexed numerous authors (Wiles, 176) and The Economist 2006) and forced
some to abandon the 'populism as an ideology' definition altogether.
This thesis proposes to use a version of definitions provided by Cas Mudde
and Paul Taggart, which allow for variations in regional manifestations of populism
by defining the concept as a "thin-centered" ideology (Mudde, 544) or an ideology
possessing an "empty heart" (Taggart, 4). As Taggart explains:
6Populism lacks a commitment to key values. While
other ideologies contain, either implicitly or explicitly,
a focus on one or more values such as equality, liberty,
and social justice, populism has no such core to it. This
explains...why populism is very often appended to
other ideologies. Populism's natural position is an
adjective attached to other ideas that fill the space at
the empty heart of populism. (Taggart, 4)
While populism appears to be best defined as an ideology, its tendency to overlap
with other ideologies must be acknowledged. Defining populism as a thin-centered
ideology gives the concept the greatest use value,2 allowing political scientists and
other academic investigators the opportunity to gain conceptual leverage of the term
by identifying greater thematic patterns. For the purpose of this study, then, populism
will be defined as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be dichotomously
separated into idealized antagonistic groups ofthe 'people' versus 'the elites', whose
proponents demonstrate their supportfor the general will of'the people' using moral
arguments.
It is important to note the concerns of dissenting authors, who deny that a
universal definition of populism can be established. Conceptually, some authors
prefer contextual definitions built off a single case study, which involve so much
detail that they practically exclude all other cases. Others champion variegated
definitions, which deny the existence of overarching universal themes and instead opt
to classify populism according to different typologies (Taggart, 10-22).
2 For a more comprehensive discussion of use-value see Knight, in particular page 225.
7Some authors, for example, have narrowed the definition of populism to
signify a certain kind of economic policy: one based on state interventionism,
significant spending, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), and redistribution
(Dornbusch and Edwards). However, not all governments who pursue such policies
are populist, and not all populist governments (in particular, governments typically
referred to as 'neopopulist') make these economic policies the backbone of their
administration. As Alan Knight summarizes, "it seems misleading - and again
reductionist - to equate populism with generic packages which combine Keynesian
policies of macro-economic fine-tuning with measures to reform and regulate labour
relations" (Knight, 243). Others have identified populism as a political style (Knight),
a political strategy (Weyland), or a political movement. Carlos de Torre offers a
helpful example of a definition belonging to the latter category, characterizing
populism as a "powerful semidemocratic and semiauthoritarian means ofmobilization
of common people" (de la Torre, 154) (emphasis added).
These dissents, however, suffer from the same conceptual weakness: authors
have reversed the definitional order of operations, relegating the 'populism' part of the
definition to a secondary position. Scholars that describe populism as a movement
ultimately imply that the 'movement' part of the definition is more important than the
'populism.' Conversely, this thesis maintains that a person can be a populist without
having a movement to support them. Ultimately, the definitions that have been briefly
reviewed above are unnecessarily exclusionary of other potential cases, obscuring
8universal patterns of populism that may exist.3 In the battle for the definitional soul of
populism it seems preferable to first focus on the universal essence ofthe term before
amending it with constraining descriptors.
RESEARCH METHODS
The empirical section of this thesis involves a qualitative investigation of the
discourse of Bolivian President Evo Morales from 2002 to 2009. Rather than
performing a content analysis, which generally involves a great deal of 'counting' and
'coding' that can obscure the context of discourse, the results and conclusions of this
investigation are drawn from an interpretative analysis of the patterns that
characterize Morales' discourse during each time period, focusing on the similarities
and differences that exist between these periods. Ultimately, the methods' portion of
this thesis involves a great deal of intelligent reading.
This investigation will examine a single case study of Bolivia, specifically the
discourse of its current president, to test hypotheses of routinization. Such an
approach could be understood as what Steven Van Evera identifies as an
"observational" test of theory, in which a scientist observes empirical data "without
imposing an external stimulus ... and asks if observations are congruent with
predictions" (Van Evera, 28). Since this particular investigation is generally
unconcerned with causality, it has forgone medium-N or large-N studies. While such
3 Admittedly, there is a tradeoff between universal and contextual definitions: one offers more nuance,
the other more leverage. The point here is not to say that universal definitions are better, but that such
authors may have been unable to identify more comprehensive, universal definitions because of
conceptual barriers that were spuriously erected.
9a decision may be controversial within certain subdisciplines of the field, it is not
unsound or unreasonable: as Alexander George and Andrew Bennet stated in their
book Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, "several kinds of
no-variance research designs can be quite useful in theory development and testing
using multiple observations from a single case. These include the deviant, crucial,
most-likely, and least-likely research designs" (George and Bennett, 33).
The Morales case was chosen as a basis of investigation because it arguably
functions as a 'crucial' case, which "must closely fit a theory if one is to have
confidence in the theory's validity" (Eckstein, 118)4. That is, the case naturally
possesses the characteristics that allow hypotheses of routinization to be tested:
Morales' humble origins signify that his populism is less likely to be falsified, the
President has been in office for three years (arguably long enough for routinization to
occur, as most presidential appointments last four years), and contrary to theories of
routinization, most people with some knowledge of the region appear to consider
Morales a populist.
SAMPLING
Every qualitative researcher must think carefully about how to obtain the most
accurate sample possible; given that relatively few cases are being observed, there is
always the chance that the particular set of data chosen for any project will not be
4 This is an arguable assertion. At the very least, however, the Morales case would qualitY as a "most
likely" or "least likely" case.
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representative of the larger reality. In this particular thesis, inaccurate sampling would
likely originate from one of two sources: (1) the interviews and speeches that are
attainable are not representative of Morales' actual discourse or (2) the attainable
discourse is representative of the larger sample, but the researcher has accidentally
chosen cases that are not congruent with the larger sample of information.
It must be said that the first of these two scenarios is plausible: although it
appears that most of Morales' major speeches and many of his interviews are
available on the internet, one must acknowledge the possibility that certain outlets
(especially news sources) are disseminating and retaining information that generates
public interest, advertising sales, and revenue. That is, newspapers and databases may
make available more of Morales' "populist interviews" than his "non-populist
interviews" because the former contains content and phrasing that are comparatively
more profitable. Still, given the sheer number of statements, interviews, and speeches
from Morales that are available, at least some concerns of sampling bias should be
ameliorated.
The author has also made an effort to minimize research-related sampling
bias. In order to obtain the most precise sample of discourse possible, the data set
includes a majority of Morales' major speeches from 2002 to 2009 (regardless of the
presence or absence of populism). Samples were drawn from forty-one different
dates throughout the seven-year period, and data was culled from national and
international sources that included interviews, speeches and biographies. In addition,
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data was evaluated in video, radio, and written form. Although a significant effort
was made to 'cast a wide net' during the collection of information, there remains
some chance that non-randomized data could detract from the accuracy of the
conclusions.
PROCESS
To safeguard the integrity of the data, the majority of the empirical data in this
paper was gathered from primary sources such as presidential statements, foreign and
national interviews, and documentaries. However, a handful of direct quotes from
Morales were drawn from secondary sources such as biographies. Nearly all of the
primary research was conducted in Spanish, signifying that a large majority of the
quotations were translated into English by the author. In instances where direct
translations may have been unclear, or had dual significance, words were left in
Spanish immediately after the English translation. In cases where Morales used an
indigenous language, those words were left in the original and then translated into
English in parentheses immediately following. By seeking out primary sources and
personally translating a large majority of the data, this study has attempted to
minimize inaccuracies and inconsistent translations that could jeopardize the
precision of the conclusions.
Given the definition of populism delineated in the second section of this
thesis, Morales' statements were evaluated based on the presence or absence of the
following three elements of the populist ideology: (1) an antiestablishment argument
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directed against some construction of 'the elite,' (2) an identification with some
construction of 'the people', and (3) an appeal to common (signifying ordinary) sense
and values. As the first two elements are commonly found in non-populist political
discourse, this analysis considers the third element to be comparatively more
important in determining populism.
Within Latin America, the chasm between common sense and academic
knowledge is especially profound. First, the region's history of colonialism and
neocolonialism imported a new (and some would say predatory) intellectual tradition
to the region that was largely exclusive of the general population. 'Enlightened'
colonial agents introduced new systems of power (often through discourse) that
"dominat[ed], restructure [ed] and [gave them] authority over the Orient," interpreted
loosely to mean Latin America (Said, 3)5. Whether this 'scientific' and technocratic
knowledge was used to manage silver mining operations or privatize natural gas and
water resources, academic knowledge has historically been the purview of Western
agents and only a very small, privileged subset ofthe local population. Conversely,
common sense and values are rooted in the (often indigenous) traditions of ordinary
people. Consequently, many ordinary people feel like their different styles of
knowledge have been (and continue to be) unappreciated.
After analyzing Morales' major speeches, key word searches were performed
in local and international news sources for the following tern1S: 'ricos' (the rich) 'la
5 Said is not addressing Latin America directly, but he makes it clear throughout the book that his
critiques of 'Orientalism' are applicable to former colonies, in general.
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oligarchia' (the oligarchy), 'el pueblo' (the people'), 'mis companeros' (my friends -
also used colloquially to establish oneself as part of the people), 'sabiduria' (wisdom),
'sensato' (sensible), 'valores' (values) and sencillez (simply, with modesty).
Here, three points concerning Spanish-to-English translation may be of
interest. First, it seems important to note that the word "elite" hardly ever features
(verbatim) in Morales' discourse. This is likely due to the singular nature of the
Bolivian context, and should not be used to preclude Morales from being a populist;
Morales uses other terms such as 'the oligarchy' and 'the rich' to signify the elite.
Second, it is important to recognize the difficulty of translating 'el pueblo'
into English. Although 'the people' in English is superficially similar to 'el pueblo' in
that both refer to groupings of individuals, it fails to capture the sense of community
and belonging that characterizes the word in Spanish. There are a number of terms
that can be used to describe groupings of people in Spanish: 'la gente' is typically
used to refer to people in the abstract, and 'las personas' (which literally translates to
'the persons') is another non-normative way of addressing various groups of people.
'El pueblo,' on the other hand, could be said to invoke a populist intention in a
manner that 'the people' 'la gente' and 'las personas' do not. The term 'el pueblo' is
not only used to describe small villages, but also to signify 'citizen' or 'nation'. The
idea of 'belonging' both to a community and to the territory is inherent in 'el pueblo,'
and as such, this term could be said to function as a double indicator of populism.
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Finally, on a more general level it must be acknowledged that not every
instance of populist discourse indicates that an individual is a populist; sporadic and
unsustained populist references are likely indicative of something else. Conversely,
not every person possessing a populist ideology can be expected to utilize populist
discourse every time that he or she speaks, as individuals often talk about a broad
variety of topics. Ultimately, the data in this thesis has been broadly interpreted to
arrive at a 'big picture' understanding of populism in Morales' discourse.
DEFENDING LANGUAGE RESEARCH
There are numerous ways that a scholar could choose to compare
manifestations of populism, none of them perfect. This study has chosen to
investigate populist discourse, because language appears to be one of the best
available proxies to gauge populist ideology.
On a conceptual level, language is both communicative and constructive: not
only can it express ideas and beliefs, but it can also challenge established practices,
patterns of discourse, and belief systems.
Language, by nature is symbolic: it is generally intended as a means of
intentional communication that infuses sounds with socially-recognizable meaning.
The idea that language is symbolic can be traced most easily to Ferdinand de
Saussure, who has been referred to as one of the "fathers of 20th-century linguistics"
(Wintle, 467). As Saussure stated in his Course ofGeneral Linguistics, "[a] linguistic
system is a series of differences of sounds combined with a series of differences of
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ideas" (Saussure, 121). The dyadic relationship between the signifier and the signified
that Saussure goes on to discuss undoubtedly implies a meaningful relationship
between sound and concept.
Author James Paul Gee has hypothesized that the process of uniting concept
with word is a natural part of the human condition, a byproduct of human efforts to
situate ourselves in the world. As Gee states:
None of us can see or deal with reality without words or
other symbols. To discuss and debate - even to think
about - reality, we have to attach words to it. These
words are, as we have seen, always connected to
negotiable, changeable, and sometimes contested
stories, histories, knowledge, beliefs, and values
encapsulated into cultural models (theories) about the
world. (Gee, 23)
Gee not only agrees that language is symbolic, but he connects the formation
of words to underlying beliefs and values. This connection between words and
beliefs is also discussed by author Stuart Price in his book Discourse Power Address,
in which he acknowledges that value and belief systems are an inherent part of
discourse. Although Price cautions that ideology in language is only discernable if
the context of discourse is considered, he ultimately agrees that "ideology is ever-
present in... the symbolic" (Price, 50).
Numerous authors have also underscored the idea that language is powerful.
Although this understanding of 'discourse as power' is most often associated with
Michel Foucault, it has been adopted and reworked by a myriad of other authors. The
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idea of discourse as a constructive (or destructive, depending on one's opinion) factor
is still widely theorized to this day; it was recently the focus of a Qualitative Social
Research Forum subcommittee, a gathering that produced the conclusion that
"discursive practices are productive... [they] produce a perception and representation
of social reality. This representation forms part of hegemonic strategies of
establishing dominant interpretations of "reality" (Diaz-Bone et al.). While academic
discussion of 'dominant interpretations' and 'hegemonic strategies' are abstract
enough to leave the common person uncertain as to implications of these statements,
others make stakes explicitly clear. As Van Dijk unequivocally states,
"communications help define, characterize, and decide the course of life, the fate of
people, and the nature of society in a symbolic world" (Van Dijk, 41 and 20).
Perhaps because so much is at risk, many theories that embrace the 'discourse
as power' idea have focused on the negative ramifications of the hypothesis.
Discourse is often seen as a conquering force, a power that has been used to stymie,
repress, and control. However, feminist theorists, in particular, have acknowledged
that power-laden discourse can also be understood in a positive light. As Clare Walsh
states, "public identities are discursively produced by [the] clash of competing norms
and expectations .. .linguistic choices often have ideological effects .. .in particular
... [on] the unequal distribution of power relations in society" (Walsh, 29). Powerful
discourse can not only challenge unequal distributions of power, but serve as a
liberating agent. As Jean Bethke Elshtain states:
17
One must move beyond a view of language as simply or
in-exorably "power over," discourse as domination, or
discourse as un-avoidably masked, and toward speech
as part of an emancipatory effort, a movement toward
social clarity and self-comprehension. (Elshtain, 605)
Ironically, the 'self-comprehension' statement takes us full circle back to Gee.
Ultimately, this study has chosen to analyze discourse in order to gauge
populism for two reasons: (1) numerous scholars have asserted that discourse reflects
people's beliefs, ideas, and ideology, and (2) if discourse is able to challenge the
status quo as authors claim, there is a significant chance that populism will emerge in
language, given its inherent critique of 'the establishment.'
Admittedly, linguistic investigation and analysis must be pursued with
caution. Populist rhetoric may not always indicate a true populist ideology, especially
in modern regimes where leaders are often called on to defend their legitimacy. Still,
where as most leaders can be expected to employ some populist rhetoric, populism
should be a central force in the discourse of individuals that possess a true populist
ideology.
There is a natural inclination to want to COlmect populism directly to human
action. Much of this stems from the concern that language may not accurately reflect
the beliefs of an individual. However, while some populist discourse likely functions
as propaganda rather than indicating populist beliefs, an investigation of allegedly
populist actions would be difficult to do well. This is especially true given that an
individual often possesses overlapping ideologies, which makes it challenging to
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deem an action 'populist' and not attribute it to socialism, nationalism, or some other
coexisting ideology. Second, even if a proposed action could clearly be identified as
'populist,' it is not clear that populism would necessarily end with the completion of
this action; there are hundreds of intervening variables that could effectively thwart
even the most stalwart populist from carrying out his 'populist' plans. Ultimately, this
thesis maintains that the ideology-discourse link is far stronger than the ideology-
action link, which makes for a better (if still limited) analysis. Although this essay
will briefly address Morales' alleged populist actions in the concluding section, this
will not be a focal point of the research.
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CHAPTER III
MORALES: A STUDY OF POPULISM IN POWER
For the purposes of this investigation the populism of President Evo Morales
will serve as a proxy for the populism of the administration as a whole. Although it
would be interesting, and likely revealing, to investigate the discourse of other
individuals within the administration, the financial and temporal constraints
associated with a Masters thesis make it necessary to narrow the focus of the
investigation. By looking only at Morales' discourse, this thesis attempts to offer a
more accurate and comprehensive sampling of populist discourse.
In order to determine whether the populism ofEvo Morales has undergone
routinization, the empirical portion of this thesis will investigate both the centrality of
populism in Morales' discourse and its characteristics. Regarding the latter, we benefit
from a typology established by author Margaret Canovan, who identifies three ideal
types of 'the people' to which populism typically appeals: the united people (rather
than one divided by factions), our people (typically based on ethnicity or kinship),
and the ordinary people (the non-elite) (Canovan, 5). In a sense, then, Canovan's
three versions of 'the people' actually refer to a socialist 'the people,' a nationalist
'the people,' and 'the people' as constructed in pure populism.
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The first part of this empirical study will establish a 'baseline' ofEvo Morales'
populist ideology using samples of his discourse drawn from 22 different speeches
during a four-year period ending with his inaugural address on 26 January 2006. This
will later be compared to a second set of discourse samples during his tenure as
president, a time period that is roughly equivalent. The results from this study are
drawn primarily from a cross sectional analysis of discourse during this time period;
however, every effort has been made to indicate relevant temporal patterns that
emerged. In addition, an effort has been made to reveal outliers.
PERIOD ONE: ESTABLISHING A BASELINE
A number of interesting patterns are revealed by Morales' Period One
discourse: first, Morales' populism is far less explicit than one might expect; second,
it is generally 'colored' by other underlying ideologies; and third, Morales tends to
construct 'the people' to mean the 'indigenous' and 'the elite' to mean traditional
political parties and their representatives in government.
The Centrality ofPopulism
Before any analysis concerning the importance of populism in Morales'
discourse can be conducted, it seems important to note that there is a significant
overlap between populism and other ideologies in the data drawn from this time
period. Two of the most prominent ideologies are nationalism and socialism6.
6 This thesis will not attempt to untangle socialist ideology from communist ideology. They are
considered here to appear roughly similar in discourse.
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Conceptually, this overlap is not altogether surprising: given the "empty heart"
definition of populism adopted for the purposes of this investigation, populism can
theoretically overlap with any number of ideologies, especially those that are
community oriented7• What is particularly interesting about these overlapping
ideologies, however, is that they appear to influence the types of moral arguments
that Morales makes and the way in which he constructs the crucial categories of "the
people' and 'the elite.'
Socialism
The socialist ideology is readily apparent in much of Morales' rhetoric, most
notably in his seemingly endless references to imperialism. Although Morales'
critiques of 'imperialism' and the 'Empire' are political on the surface, this analysis
maintains that the majority are also economic. This categorization is based partly on
the context of the quotes, and partly because Morales chooses to forgo the use of the
comparatively more political discourse of 'neo-colonialism.'8 The Empire-economy
connection is especially clear in an interview that Morales gave following a failed
presidential bid in 2002. He stated in response to a reporter's question concerning the
United States, "[the US] does not like democracies that are not servicing the
Empire ... the Bolivian people are tired of this savage capitalism, I remain convinced
that capitalism is the greatest enemy of humanity and of the environment" (Gaete).
7 Admittedly, sometimes it is the exclusion of such individuals that makes possible the political
identification ofthe community.
8 References to colonialism do occasionally appear in Morales' rhetoric, but far less frequently than
references to imperialism.
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Although Empire can be understood in many different ways, Morales appears to
interpret it in at least partly economic terms.
As the same statement demonstrates, Morales often moves beyond references
to imperialism to establish himself in opposition to neoliberalism and capitalism, and
in favor of a more equal distribution of revenues, land, and wealth. Although some
analysts have accused Morales of parroting the socialist language of Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez, Morales' own experience as an anti-privatization activist in
issues of water and hydrocarbons, as a union leader, and his affiliation with local
coca-growing unions at least make it plausible that he actually possesses these views.
In many cases, Morales' socialist arguments are directed against the
international economic community, particularly against states and institutions that are
perceived to have a strong affiliation with the West. For example, he states on
November 2003 that "[t]he day must come when the IMF and the World Bank pay for
all that they have robbed from our people" (Mirian Elizalde). He again critiques these
organizations by name in June 2005, stating:
The poor people of this country are ... risking our lives
and blocking highways in order to open pathways of
hope. We are not responsible for destabilization
because those who attack Bolivian security are
international organizations like the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank... [we can] no longer
be dependent like beggars to Imperialist leftovers.
(Contreras Baspineiro)
While international actors bear the brunt of Morales' socialist ire, the
ties between 'Western Imperialists' and (various groups of) privileged local
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residents are nearly always implied, and sometimes stated outright. The
proximate underpinnings of Morales' socialism are especially apparent in an
interview that he gave to journalist Yvonne Zimmerman in La Paz in February
2003. Defending his Movement towards Socialism (MAS) political party,
Morales stated:
We have a (governing) program based on the
propositions of the people, from an anti-neoliberal and
anti-capitalist position ... [w]e are talking about ending
the political mafia. Now that the neoliberal model has
failed, it's time for the poor to impose their own model.
(Zimmerman)
His sometimes implicit critique of local power brokers again becomes
explicit in an interview conducted later that year. As he stated, "Bolivia is
very rich, but the majority of us are poor because there is a bad distribution of
riches in few hands... [we must] change the family oligarchy that controls
politics" (Cabrera).
Ultimately, Morales' socialist ideology is quite apparent during this
period and it affects the way he constructs populist arguments.
Nationalism
Nationalism also plays an important role in Morales' discourse, given not only
his identification with the poor, but his heritage as an indigenous Aymara.9 Andreas
9 For the purposes of this study, nationalism will signify the construction of nationhood along ethnic
lines, a definition akin to ethnic variants of nationalism that appear in the work of Anthony D. Smith
and Andreas Wimmer.
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Wimmer would likely characterize the state-building history of Bolivia as an instance
of the "ethnicisation of bureaucracy": a situation in which "ethnic ties [were]
reinforced and politicized given that distribution struggles [were] waged via ethnic
c1ientilist networks"(Wimmer, 66). In most instances, Bolivia's indigenous population
was on the losing side of such distribution struggles. Comprising anywhere between
60 and 70 percent of the total population, they fared far worse than their mestizo
(European mixed descent) counterparts: even after independence, indigenous groups
were legally denied access to education and political participation. As one journalist
wrote, the past 500 years of indigenous history in Bolivia involved "massacre,
genocide, rape, slavery, torture, and exploitation" (Appleton). Or, as Roberto Navia
& Darwin Pinto, two people intimately familiar with the country's history, stated:
People throughout history have treated indigenous
people like animals. It's worth remembering that until
the 1950s, indigenous people were not allowed to walk
through Plaza Murillo in the centre of La Paz, home to
the presidential palace and the city cathedral, because it
was reserved for whites, oligarchs and politicians.
(Cabrera)
According to co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in
Washington DC, Mark Weisbrot, many of these disparities have not improved
significantly in modern times. Although indigenous Bolivians have won mostly-equal
legal rights over the past 70 years and made significant political advances with the
approval of the new constitution in January 2009, indigenous Bolivians still receive
40 percent less schooling than their non-indigenous counterparts, and approximately
--------------
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one percent of Bolivia's population, mostly mestizos, still control two thirds ofthe
country's agrarian land (Weisbrot).
Past and present inequalities continue to affect the daily lives of many
indigenous citizens, which makes it understandable why Morales' indigenous heritage
plays such a prominent role in his ideas and discourse. Although his progressive
message regarding the potential of the indigenous community has been commended
by human rights and indigenous rights activists, opponents have accused him of
engaging in reverse racism against the non-indigenous minority O\Jewman).IO
Partly in an effort to reclaim public acknowledgement of indigenous dignity,
Morales frequently references to indigenous groups as the 'original' and 'absolute'
owners of Bolivia. As he stated during a national interview conducted in October
2002:
The indigenous peoples are achieving the recuperation
of their land, their territory that was snatched from them
more than 500 years ago ...now we possess awareness
and its impossible for them to do away with us because
we are daring to recuperate the political power that
belongs to us, as it should be, we are the absolute
owners of this noble earth. (Carrion)
It is also interesting to note that in many instances, Morales appears to identify
first as an indigenous resident, second as a member of the poor, and only then as a
Bolivian; even when he attempts to be more inclusive in his ideas and language, an
undercurrent of ethnicity typically remains. During a speech given shortly before
10 This thesis will sidestep the nOImative issue altogether, focusing only on Morales' discourse.
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taking office, he stated, "[w]e are seeking the unity of all sectors, respecting diversity,
respecting how different we are, we all have the right to life. But if we're speaking of
Bolivia, the Aymara, Quechua, Mojeno, Chapaco, Valluno, Chiquitano, Yuracares,
Chipayas, and Murato people are the absolute owners of this large land" (Morales
"Speech Given at Indigenous Investiture").
In conclusion, Morales' nationalism, much like his socialism, influences the
way that he sees the world, and in turn, his populist discourse.
The Characteristics ofPopulism
The second notable characteristic of Morales' discourse during this early
period is that populism appears far more subtly than one might expect. Although his
discourse can be deemed populist when interpreted as a whole, Morales very rarely
offers succinct populist arguments. Instead, much of his populism is implicit, and
only apparent when considered in context. Clearly, Morales makes anti-elite
arguments and identifies with 'the people,' but the 'common values' component of
populism, which is arguably the most important, rarely appears explicitly.
The only time that populism can be characterized as explicit is during the two-
month period before Morales assumed office, a time frame that includes speeches
surrounding the presidential election and his inaugural address. One of the most well-
rounded examples of populist discourse occurs in an interview that Morales gave
shortly before the elections on 18 December 2005. As he stated:
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"We will continue to campaign. We have confidence in
the dignified and honest vote of the Bolivian people,
who are betting on change because they are tired of the
corruption associated with the neoliberal economic
model and the political mafia...we want to demonstrate
how one can govern through the principles of ama sua
(not thieving) ama llula (not lying) and ama quella
(being active) ... the indigenous plight is going to be
advanced once we demonstrate how a government can
truly function in favor of the people and the homeland.
(Robles Sosa)
Even though there are obvious nationalist undercurrents to this statement, it contains
an explicit reference to the people, the elite, and a moral argument based on the
values of the people (in this case indigenous). Specifically, the 'political mafia' has
governed unwisely, but 'the people' (and Morales as their representative) would
govern in a morally-just manner for the benefit of the homeland.
The only other clear example of populist discourse in the early period occurs
in Morales' inaugural address on 22 January 2006. As that speech states:
Thankfully, the people are wise. One must recognize
the wisdom of the Bolivian people, it must be
respected, and it must be applied. It doesn't have
anything to do with importing economic politics or
economic recipes from above or from outside ... wanting
to import politics to Bolivia is an error. Social
organizations, amauta councils which I greatly esteem
in the high plains near La Paz, unions from the
countryside and from the city, the organizations called
capitanias [literally captaincies] in eastern Bolivia, they
are a reservoir of scientific knowledge to defend life
[and] to save humanity. It involves using these
organizations to implement politics and not imposing
politics that service powerful groups in Bolivia or in the
exterior. (Morales Inauguration Speech)
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In this passage, the "wisdom" ofthe Bolivian people is explicit; however, the identity
of the elite must be deduced. While it remains fairly evident that Morales is critiquing
the government, which allegedly has imported alien policies from the international
community, the argument is not as concisely populist as one might expect.
Still, even though Morales does not typically offer concise populist
arguments, he identifies with populist principles in other ways. Although the
'common values' element of populism is mostly implicit in his speeches that discuss
'the elite' and 'the people', Morales makes it clear that he values common sense over
technocratic or academic knowledge. He frequently discusses the importance of
honesty and hard work, and as stated in a March 2005 interview, guides himself by
"respect [for] the people, forgiveness ... sovereignty against imperialism... only
fighting to defend our identity...honesty, sincerity, and consequence," all values that
he attributes to his father (Bruschtein). However, his stand for common values is
perhaps best represented in a conversation that took place in March 2005, when a
reporter asked him if he was a Marxist. Morales responded as follows:
What is Marxism? I come from peasant communities,
from the people, not from universities or other
educational centers. I can speak of Marxism, but what
importance does it have? It doesn't involve importing
policies, ideologies, or programs. The people know this.
Our organizations are wise enough to solve their
problems, in fact they are the reservoir of knowledge
until scientists came to power [hasta cientificos] in
defense of life and of humanity. Don't talk to me about
Marxism, Leninism, Trotskyism, we're just wasting
time. (Gonzalez)
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Here, Morales questions the value of academic concepts like Marxism, contrasting it
with the wisdom of commoners. Ultimately, 'common values' appear to be quite
important to Morales, even if he does not make references to this exact term.
The People
By far, the most noticeable of the three populist elements in Morales' rhetoric
is his identification with, and appeal to, the people. This self-identification can be
found in both direct references to his fellow Bolivians and indirect story telling.
Although this conclusion has been drawn only from the data analyzed in this project,
other authors appear to agree with this supposition. As author Mufioz-Pogossian
reported when discussing the time period in question:
The Aymara and coca leaf leader Evo Morales became
the main leader of the opposition in Congress. Building
on an appeal at the local level, the majority of MAS
deputies were uninominal. Morales built his image
around the opposition to coca eradication measures in the
country and used the indigenous identity to appeal to
people in the struggle. (Mufioz-Pogossian, 152)
If one were to evaluate Morales' discourse based on Canovan's three ideal types, it
could be said that Morales most often refers to 'our people' (based on ethnicity or
kinship), occasionally appeals to 'the ordinary people' (the non-elite and more
specifically, the poor), and only rarely petitions 'the united people' (a comparatively
more inclusive category) during this time period. Even when Morales makes an effort
to construct 'the people' less restrictively, there is often an underlying ideological
current that the 'authentic' people are either indigenous or poor. The only exception to
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this rule is taken from a speech following the ouster of former President Sanchez de
Lozada in December 2005, in which Morales stated:
I believe only in the power of the people...with all that
has happened in Bolivia, I have seen the importance of
the power of a whole people, of a whole nation. For
those of us who believe it important to defend
humanity, the best contribution we can make is to help
create that popular power. This happens when we check
our personal interests with those of the group. (Morales
"I Believe Only in the Power of the People")
Apart from this statement, however, Morales typically appears to be referencing the
poor or the indigenous when he speaks of 'the people'. The latter makes for a
particularly interesting case study: either consciously or subconsciously, Morales
repeatedly begins statements, interviews, and speeches during this time period by
referencing the indigenous people, then substituting in the larger category of 'Bolivian
people' into discourse by the end of the discussion. This is readily apparent in a
February 2003 interview, in which he stated:
We, the original people, organized ourselves into a
political instrument for the sovereignty of the
people ... we have decided to recuperate land and power
for ourselves, the Quechuas, Aymaras, Tupi-Guaranies
together with the working middle class, our enemies
tremble...we are constructing committees for the
defense of sovereignty, and with that we are going to
defend the fight of the Bolivian people. (Zimmerman)
Although Morales first identifies as indigenous, he makes some effort to make the
category more inclusive by the end of the interview. Whether this is a subconscious
tendency or a maneuver to gain political currency remains unclear.
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In truth, Morales' explicit appeals on behalf of the people are so frequent that
it begs the question whether some analysts within academia and the news media may
be identifying Morales as a populist solely based on the sheer number of these
appeals. It is very possible that Morales' appeals to 'the people' are automatically
being categorized as being populist regardless of the presence or absence of a
common values argument.
Apart from explicit references to 'the people,' it is interesting to note how
Morales identifies with various constructions of 'the people' through stories that often
precede or follow critiques of some allegedly corrupt elite group. Most of these
stories are aimed at establishing Morales as part of 'the common people,' by shedding
light on his humble origins11. Two stories in particular, were circulated widely during
this time. The first, which will be referred to as 'the Orange Story,' involves Morales'
upbringing as a llama herder in the Chapare department. The story appears in its full
entirety during an interview given to Argentine journalist Luis Bruschstein in March
2005:
I worked as an animal herder, I walked kilometers to
carry a heard of llamas from one place to another. At
times I would be going on the road with llamas and a
bus would pass.. .the passengers would be eating
oranges and throwing the peels through the window.
And there I went.. .eating the orange peels that I would
pick up. I dreamed of one day traveling in the bus and
eating oranges. It seems like a lie [parece mentira] that
now I do a similar journey in an airplane. (Bruschtein)
11 Morales also occasionally brings up a story of how his mother, an indigenous Aymara, was
forbidden from walking through the plazas of La Paz fifty years ago.
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What is interesting to note is that this particular exchange establishes Morales as part
of 'the common people' twice over: not only does it highlight that he was a poor llama
herder (an unassuming position that requires hard work and constant attention), but it
makes it clear that he feels uncomfortable, like an outsider, in his new life where he
travels that same route in an airplane.
The second story that appears frequently in newspaper articles involves an
interaction that Morales had with a wealthy city dweller during his presidential
campaign. Again, the most complete version of this story was given to Bruschstein,
but snippets of it were re-circulated in a number of other media outlets. As Morales
tells the story:
One day when I was walking through the streets with
my friends during the political campaign, a very put-
together city woman said to me, 'I'm going to tell you
Evo, you're not prepared to govern.' She said it very
aggressively and I didn't want to be aggressive back, so
I just said 'thank you'. Then the woman told me 'you
keep going Evo, I am going to vote for you because you
are honest.' I see that the middle class, intellectuals,
even healthy, honest businessmen are becoming part of
the (MAS) movement. (Bruschtein)
Like the former story, this anecdote establishes Morales as an individual who is
different than city dwellers and who shares the values (in this case honesty) of the
good people.
The Elite
During this early period, Morales constructs the category of the 'the elite' to be
more diverse than 'the people.' Depending on which of the underlying ideologies is
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dominant, 'the elite' can mean anything from international institutions (primarily US~
based), the oligarchy (typically referring to wealthy land owners), or the current
administration (and ruling-party politicians more generally).
When Morales' socialist leanings come to the forefront, 'the elite' is often
constructed to mean 'the West'. This is true for a December 2003 interview in which
Morales stated, "We are convinced that capitalism is the enemy of the earth, of
humanity and of culture. The US government does not understand our way of life and
our philosophy. But we will defend our proposals, our way of life and our demands
with the participation of the Bolivian people" (Morales "Legalizing the Colonization
ofthe Americas"). Two years later, Morales made it clear that his focus had not
changed significantly. As he stated:
The will of the people was imposed this September and
October and has begun to overcome the empire's
cannons. We have lived for so many years through the
confrontation of two cultures: the culture of life
represented by the indigenous people, and the culture
of death represented by the West. (Morales "I Believe
Only in the Power of the People")
On occasion, Morales also constructs 'the elite' to mean 'the oligarchy,' by
which he generally refers to wealthy landowners (and indirectly the politicians who
represent their interests). Commenting on the trajectory of the Bolivian people over
the past few decades, Morales stated, "[w]hat happened during all these years of
profound revolt, the dismissal of presidents and election advances, is a test of force
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between the people, which each time has won additional land, and the oligarchic
tradition, which each time loses more space" (Febbro).
However, during most of the early period, Morales portrays 'the elite' as the
traditional political parties. He accuses these agents of being inept, corrupt, mired in
bureaucracy, and overly swayed by international interests; given these parties' history
of giving out fraudulent land titles to wealthy foreign and local investors among other
questionable actions, many of his critiques are understandable. His portrayal of 'the
elite' as the 'old guard government' is evident throughout his discourse during the
time period. It begins in January 2005, when he stated:
I am very sorry that the Bolivian government commits
monumental errors that punish the Bolivian people.
The Bolivian people, with good reason, are rising up,
are organizing, and are mobilizing to end those
decrees.... [t]his government isn't excited (no se
anima) to be with people unless they are loyal servants
to multinational corporations. (Entrevista Al Lfder
Campesino Cocalero Y Diputado Evo Morales Del Mas
Y Candidato a La Presidencia De Bolivia.)
This again becomes apparent in July 2005, when Morales stated "[w]ith courage and
defiance, we brought down Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, the symbol of neoliberalism
in our country on October 17, the Bolivians' day of dignity and identity. We began to
bring down the symbol of corruption and the political mafia" (Padilla and Stefanoni).
However, the 'good people' and 'bad government' dichotomy is best expressed in
Morales' inaugural address in 2006:
Maneuvers, more maneuvers ...the ways of how to
deceive the people and the way to auction off the
- -------
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people ... they left us a "loteado" country, an auctioned
country. I am almost convinced: if the state
administrators had been intelligent, if they had loved
this country and didn't just want to loot this country and
make themselves rich, if there had truly been
responsible people who would lovingly guide this
country and its people Bolivia would be better than
Switzerland...a country that developed without natural
resources. Politics means the science of serving the
people. You must serve the people and not live off the
people...brothers and sisters, our original authorities
knew that when one becomes an authority, it is to serve
the people. (Morales Inauguration Speech)
This quote is revealing in many respects; it not only demonstrates a nationalist
reference to the integrity of the original authorities but it offers a populist appeal to
the non-elite 'brothers and sisters.'
In conclusion, while Morales occasionally constructs 'the elite' to signify
international agents and the oligarchy, most of his populist ire appears to be directed
against the government during this early period of discourse.
PERIOD Two: MORALES' DISCOURSE IN OFFICE
The following section will address Morales' later period of populism,
beginning after his inaugural address on 26 January 2006 and ending in April 2009.
In total, 20 different sources were consulted during this time frame in order to
establish the most comprehensive sample of his discourse during this period.
The Centrality ofPopulism:
In this latter period of discourse, Morales generally refrains from making
succinct populist statements. One of the only compact arguments he makes occurs at
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a roundtable discussion with Randy Alonso Falcon earlier this year, following the
approval of the country's new constitution. Although the constitution was approved
by nearly 60 percent of citizens, it was rejected by local residents in the (opposition)
eastern departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija. As Morales describes the
event:
I want to acknowledge the Bolivian people for their
participation and for their awareness of a profound
transformation in our country... [which] has permitted
for Bolivia to be refounded ... in search of ... equality,
dignity, and the unity of the Bolivian people, still
respecting our diversity ... despite deceitful campaigns
[by the opposition], a dirty campaign, despite the fear
that oligarchic groups tried to arouse in the
population... we are happy, very happy about this, the
sovereign election of the Bolivian people .. .I believe
only in the conscience of the Bolivian people. (Alonso
Falcon)
While this may not qualify to some as a picture perfect populist quote, it certainly
established 'the people' against 'the oligarchy' and implies that only 'the people' are
concerned with the values of equality, dignity, and unity.
Although no other concise examples of populism exist during this time period,
all three populist components can be found in his discourse. It seems especially
important to note that appeals to common values feature prominently throughout the
period.
On many occasions, Morales portrays the people as the bastion of honesty and
integrity, juxtaposing them to the comparative evil or deceitful 'elite'. This still
occasionally occurs implicitly, as author Francisco Pineda identifies in his book, Eva
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Morales: El Cambio Comenz6 en Bolivia. As Pineda quotes Morales, "I am
... convinced that sincerity and honesty are the most important things concerning
Bolivia, to .. .love our homeland. It's not possible that there are authorities who ignore
the national majorities, without thinking and without loving this homeland" (Pineda,
82-83).
In addition to using 'the good people' as a platform to critique local political
elites, Morales occasionally uses this category to critique (alleged) US intervention in
Bolivia. As he states, "just because we're underdeveloped ... does not mean that we're
going to submit ourselves to this type of humiliation...we are dignified, honest,
healthy" (Pineda, 108). At times, the defense of the people's honesty becomes more
explicit. As Morales stated in an interview in September 2000:
The indigenous people are a culture of dialogue and we
are fundamentally a culture of life .... [i]n Bolivia we
are gathering and drawing from our experiences using a
program called the good life. In order to live 'better'
sometimes you have to exploit ...to steal. ...to
discriminate ....to plunder, but to live the good life is to
live communally, to live collectively. (Morales Speech
to the United Nations General Assembly)
Although 'the people' here specifically references the indigenous community,
they are shown to be more honest and less discriminatory than others, who are overly
concerned with living the 'good life' (implying the importance of wealth and material
possessions). The integrity of 'the people' is also apparent in an interview that
Morales gave in March 2009, when he stated, "I am serving the people based on the
----------------- ------
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rules that our ancestors left uS...no lying, no robbing, be active ... the [presidential]
palace ...used to be only for groups, now it is for the people" (Zepeda Varas).
During this time period, Morales also appeals to the wisdom of 'the people',
in addition to their honesty; typically alleging that the people's judgment has been
unacknowledged by others with a more secular academic background. This tension
between cornmon wisdom and academic knowledge is most apparent in a statement
that Morales issued following US President Barack Obama's election in November
2008. As Morales stated, "In the past, like here, the African American movement
suffered great discrimination.. .I say that because I have gone through that same
experience .. .in Bolivia there are some groups which think that indigenous people
cannot govern, they cannot be presidents. They think that they are the only ones who
went to school and that are prepared to rule, to dominate" (Morales, 2008).
Identifying with common ideas of knowledge and wisdom is something
Morales does repeatedly during this second period. As he states in an interview in
June 2006, "I am not yet an expert on financial or economic matters ... [f]or me,
education comes day by day. Before, it was the union, the amplifications (los
ampliados), the marches, the gatherings .. .it's one thing to have a diploma and another
thing to have knowledge" (Sivak). The idea again becomes apparent in an interview
given on April 2007, in which he stated to a group of 100 Senators in the lower house
of Congress, "I wasn't able to study economy or law, but I'm not sorry about it...I
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have learned here... [w]hen I was young, my parents taught me to be respectful and
humble" (Sivak, 169).
Finally, Morales' understanding of 'the people' as both honest and wise is
sometimes presented as a single thought:
I come from a very humble family, from a family of the
Aymara nation that historically has been
excluded... [t]he absence of the State in our indigenous
and peasant communities has left much to be desired .. .I
want you to know, I didn't have the opportunity to go to
the university, to study ... the best resource (capital) that
our movement and I have is honesty. (Morales
Intervencion De Evo Morales Ante EI Pleno Del
Parlamento Europeo, 155)
Regardless of whether Morales is emphasizing the honesty or wisdom of the people
(or both), his appeals to common values permeate his discourse during the second
period.
Nationalism
As a number of the quotations mentioned above indicate, there is some
presence of nationalism during Morales' Period Two Discourse, especially during
Morales' first two years in office.
On at least two separate occasions during 2006, Morales speaks of his
ancestors not being permitted to walk through public spaces. As he states in May
2006, "[s]ome 50 or 60 years ago, our grandparents and our parents didn't have the
right to enter into Plaza Murillo, my mother told me that they didn't have the right to
walk on the sidewalks." This story emerges again in December, when Morales links
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the tale to "fascist and racist sectors in Santa Cruz, who don't want [the indigenous]
people to enter into the fairgrounds today" (Morales "Interview"). There is also a fair
amount of populism in this statement: Morales' use of the word "our" rather than
"my" underscores his self-identification as part of 'the people.'
Morales' nationalism also becomes apparent when he preferences the
indigenous community as the rightful owners of Bolivian territory. As he stated in an
interview in May 2006, shortly after assuming office, "If we're talking about
Bolivia... natural resources belong to the native indigenous people, the absolute
owners of the noble earth are the native indigenous people ...there are still some
people who don't understand this" (Morales " Palabras Del Presidente De La
Republica, Evo Morales Ayma, En La Firma De Los Acuerdos De Cooperacion Y
Solidaridad").
Land is again at the heart of the Morales' contrast between the indigenous
people and (allegedly) possessive landowners, when he states in 2007 that "[w]e are
talking about .. .landholders that only hoard land to negotiate, to sell, and not to work.
These lands must return to the hands of the state to be redistributed. Some people
from eastern Bolivia are threatening... they can threaten, but they should know that
we are a people, Aymara and Quechua, the absolute owners of this noble earth. If
before they always abused us, now they can never abuse us because we are one
people" (Pineda).
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Although the beginning of this second period of discourse is filled with
nationalist references, Morales' nationalist language noticeably diminishes in the
samples of discourse drawn from 2008 and 2009. Although the element of ethnicity is
still present in Morales' discourse, it does not appear to be as central.
Socialism
Most of the socialism that appears in Morales' discourse during this latter
period is constrained in some way: although some form of socialism is present in his
discourse, the language and ideas that surface in his speeches and interviews are more
measured than one would expect from a stalwart socialist.
To be fair, Morales still occasionally engages in full socialist critiques of the
status quo, generally against the topics of privatization and capitalism. As he stated in
November 2007, "I don't agree (no comparto) with capitalism.. .it's not possible that
some families, some transnationals continue to allow capital to accumulate in only a
few hands, plundering natural resources, exploiting human beings ... they create
instruments of subjugation, of domination and recolonization" (Morales "Opening
Speech"). In addition to demonstrating hints of nationalism, this quotation demonizes
capitalism and multinational corporations, or at least their allegedly predatory actions
against the citizens of Bolivia.
However, most of the socialist arguments that he presents during this time are
noticeably tempered. For example, during his speech to the United Nations General
Assembly in 2007, Morales offered a very controlled critique of capitalism. As he
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stated, "1 understand perfectly that companies have the right to recover their
investments and they have the right to profit...but not so much as before, which
amounted to the outright plunder of our natural resources" (Morales Speech to the
United Nations General Assembly). While Morales accuses market forces of
propagating the plunder of Bolivia's natural resources in the past, he recognizes profit
as a legitimate end of capitalist enterprise (and tacitly accepts capitalism itself), a
truly revolutionary (pun intended) idea for any socialist to countenance.
The socialist-lite ideology is also present in his discussions of the future and
of the tenets of his own ideology. During this time period, Morales highlights what
can only be described as a defeatist socialist program. As he states, "1 feel as though
there will never be [true] equality, but to make these economic differences less
pronounced would finally permit persons who today have a lot to maybe help us
convince other families that only think of themselves and not in the people" (Morales
"Opening Speech"). Here, equality is presented as unattainable and the (assumedly
wealthy or landowning) families must be reasoned with rather than overthrown.
Finally, Morales also appears to problemmatize his own commitment to
socialist principles during this period, accusing the opposition of exaggerating the
socialist nature of his intentions by using "false arguments" that he wanted to "end
private property in Bolivia" (Morales, 2008). As the abolition of private property is
generally considered central to most strands of socialist thought, this is a very
interesting assertion for Morales to make.
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Ultimately, although a few instances of pure socialism appear in Morales'
discourse during this latter period, the majority of Morales' socialist language
(according to the 20 samples considered here) is noticeably deflated during this time.
The Characteristics ofPopulism
The People
Towards the end of Period Two one can identify a subtle shift from Canovan's
'our people' to the 'united people,' although admittedly, the transition is not clear cut.
Shortly after taking office, Morales' indigenous heritage still features
prominently in his construction of 'the people.' As he stated in an interview on 15
May 2006, "I want to say in the name of the Bolivian people, especially in the name
of the native indigenous movement: we want to have allies to defend life, we want to
end the hate [of Bolivia's history], to close that chapter" (Morales 1ntervencion De
Evo Morales Ante El Pleno Del Parlamento Europeo, 164). Ethnically-oriented
constructions of the people again surface at the end of 2006, when he states, "[i]t's an
enormous satisfaction to be here representing my people, my homeland, and
especially the indigenous movement" (Morales Speech to the United Nations General
Assembly, 165).
However, towards the end of his four-year term in office it begins to become
apparent that Morales is slowly expanding the category of 'the people' to become
more inclusive. Although he still gives the indigenous and poor communities a
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special place of distinction, his number of references to "all" Bolivian people jumps
dramatically.
As Morales states in 2007, "1 govern for all of Bolivia...just because my
government focuses on bettering the situation of sectors that have been passed over,
doesn't mean that 1 don't take care of all Bolivians. There is only one Bolivia" (2007).
This concept of the nation united is again apparent in a speech given by Morales
following the approval of the country's new constitution in January 2009. As he
stated then, "[t]his constitution is for all Bolivians, not just one group. 1heard them
[the opposition] say that they want a new pact, but this pact is the new Constitution
that was approved by the Bolivian people" (Morales "Morales Asegura Que La
Nueva Cpe Es EI Pacto Nacional Refrendado Por EI Pueblo Boliviano").
Still, although there is some opening of the people category, it is not
completely inclusive. As Morales states in April 2009, "this is another unforgettable
day that has been made possible by the awareness of the Bolivian people and the
participation of distinct sectors, workers, farmers, original citizens, university
students, and professionals" ("Morales Logra La Aprobaci6n De La Ley Del Regimen
Electoral Transitorio"). While he takes care to acknowledge the heterogeneous nature
of the coalition, he still excludes the opposition, landowners, and commercial
farmers.
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His nationalism, although waning, also makes for a strange bedfellow with his
newfound need to unite the country. Ultimately, this produces a sort of double speak
that is often perplexing:
The new constitution seeks equality for all Bolivians.
We are such a diverse society. There are people with
blue eyes, green eyes, black eyes, dark skin, mestizo... I
always say that we are Bolivians, but there are
Bolivians that have been here for centuries and
Bolivians that are more contemporary. Those that have
been here the longest, the indigenous, are the majority
and the poorest. And the others, who are the minority,
are the richest. Our constitution seeks to equalize these
two groups because we are all Bolivians. (Newman)
A second trend that deserves mention is the construction of 'the people' as
being aligned with the government, and vice versa. First, Morales takes great care to
show that his administration is working on behalf of the people with their best
interests at heart. As he stated in his reflection on his first year in office, "We
gained... a lot of experience that will allow us to continue governing for the Bolivian
people, and within this first year of government we complied with the demands of the
people, the clamorous requests of the people concerning the nationalization of
hydrocarbons and of natural gas ... this has given the popular movement new value"
("Mesa Redonda: Entrevista a Evo Morales, a Un Afio De Asumir La Presidencia:
"Bolivia Se Dignifica""). Not only is the government working for the benefit of the
people, but it has (allegedly) helped reinvigorate popular movements. Morales
reinforces this connection multiple times throughout 2007, stating that "[p]olitics is
------
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serving the people; if we become involved in politics, it is to serve the people"
(Morales "Opening Speech") and that he had "listened to the needs" of the people for
the past 20 months in office (Morales Speech to the United Nations General
Assembly).
Nor does Morales present the people-government relationship as being one-
sided. Rather, he implies that it is recognized and supported by the people themselves.
As he states, "As democrats, we are not afraid of the people ... my power has a very
legitimate origin.. .! have the support of millions of Bolivians" (2007).
Ultimately, two tendencies are notable in Morales' construction of the people
during this latter period: first, the category of 'the people' generally appears to
become more inclusive towards the end of the period, although this transition does
not occur clearly and often results in doublespeak. Second, Morales often constructs
'the people' as being effectively integrated into the government.
The Elite
In Period Two, Morales tends to construct the category of 'the elite' as the
opposition or the oligarchy. This is not always the case, of course; occasionally he
also opposes 'the people' against previous governments (Morales Intervencion De
Evo Morales Ante EI Pleno Del Parlamento Europeo, 161) and imperialism (Morales
Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 172). However, the majority of
Morales' references to 'the elite' fall into one of these two categories.
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During his first few years in office, Morales typically places 'the people' in
opposition to the traditional oligarchy, referencing the antagonism between these two
groups in both a historical and modern perspectives. His discourse very clearly
establishes the oligarchy as the historical enemy of the people. As he stated in
September 2007:
We have begun to de-colonize Bolivia internally and
externally. I say internally because in the past masters
ruled our country. If we review our history we find that
viceroy masters, religious groups, and the oligarchy
have ruled. The people have never had any
power. ... [n]ow we are establishing the people's power,
so that sovereignty belongs to the people instead of to a
group of families. (Morales Speech to the United
Nations General Assembly)
This also functions as a nice example of populist discourse contrasting the "masters,
religious groups, and the oligarchy" against the sovereignty ofthe people.
Morales also indicates that powerful families continue to oppose the interests
of the people. In many cases, statements with this content coincided with autonomy
movements in Bolivia's (opposition) Media Luna departments. As the President
stated in March 2008, when the autonomy movements were gaining momentum:
It is not a matter of 'East' versus 'West,' it is a matter of
groups: the oligarchy from the east against the policies
that we are implementing... [b]efore, those who were
demanding autonomy were in the government...
now... they don't know how to keep sucking the blood
of the Bolivian people so they want autonomy for the
provinces. (Newman)
48
Later during his tenure as president, however, Morales begins to construct 'the
elite' less as the oligarchy (with presumed ties to power, wealth, and land) and more
as the political opposition. As Morales states in the opening speech at the Second
Annual Latin American Humanist Forum "1 want to say that it's in vain that some
politicians, some civic leaders are hitting barracks (golpeando cuarteles) it's in vain to
try and boycott economically ... they are not going to be able to do it, 1am convinced,
because we are with the people fighting to liberate our country" (Morales "Opening
Speech").
Although Morales denigrates the opposition frequently, calling them "rats"
among other names ("Evo Inicia Campana Para Concentrar EI Poder Del Congreso"),
he stresses that people are united with him against a common enemy. As he stated in
October 2008:
1 have to negotiate, dialogue with terrorists, with
people who commit genocide, with subversives...and
that's not what 1 call them, that's what the people call
them...and everything that occurred last September
[and political deaths of 16 individuals in the Pando
department, among other things] is tyrannical, a savage
attitude of the opposition that in the end was conquered
by the people. (Rojas)
Ultimately, Morales constructs 'the elite' during this time to mean the opposition or
the oligarchy.
Analysis
A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn from a side-by-side
comparison of the two periods.
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First, Morales' appeals to, and identification with, common values and
wisdom appear become stronger after he assumes office, which would indicate that
routinzation has not taken place. Whereas in previous occasions Morales had
established 'the people's' values to be good implicitly, he now makes that claim more
explicit, identifYing with, and appealing to, the people's values (namely honesty) and
wisdom more frequently.
Second, the data analyzed in this thesis indicates that both of the overlapping
ideologies identified in Morales' Period One discourse weaken after Morales assumes
office. This is particularly notable with socialism: whereas Morales' was prone to
fiery socialist rhetoric (and arguably ideas) before assuming office, he begins to
demonstrate a much more nuanced ideology as President. In addition, he often
engages in a type of double speak that seriously calls into question the integrity of
both underlying ideologies.
Third, it seems important to note that Morales' construction of the people
begins with an emphasis on Canovan's 'our people' (a nationalist construction) and
moves towards the more inclusive 'united people' (a socialist construction) during the
later period. His identification with 'the common people' is present in both periods
but dominates neither.
Finally, Morales' construction of 'the elite' changes from signifying
'established political parties' in Period One to becoming more focused against the
oligarchy and a subset of opposition politicians in Period Two. Whereas pre-
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presidency Morales constructed the government to be a corrupt and antagonistic force
that worked against 'the people,' in Period Two the government is basically shown to
function as 'the people' incarnate.
In the end, although the superficial characteristics of populism change from
Period One to Period Two, it becomes more central to Morales' discourse in office.
------- ----
51
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis argues that populism has not undergone routinzation in office.
Instead, the common values element of Morales' populist ideology, which is arguably
the most important aspect, actually became stronger after Morales assumed the
presidency. Although the superficial characteristics of Morales' populism are
different during the two periods, populism still appears to drive his thoughts and
dictate, to a certain extent, the manner in which he constructs the political
environment in Bolivia during his tenure as President.
In addition, this study has inadvertently revealed that greater care should be
taken in determining populism and classifying leaders as populist, both within
academia and the media. Although this thesis has deemed Morales to be a populist,
this determination was only possible after a careful and detailed study. During
Morales' early discourse, in particular, populism is only apparent when his rhetoric is
considered as a whole and in context. Care should be taken to avoid calling Morales,
or any other individual, a populist based only on his or her appeals to 'the people.'
Such references are particularly prominent in Morales' discourse, but they cannot be
considered the defining feature of populism: many non-populist leaders also make
appeals to 'the people' in an effort to establish political credibility. While the people-
elite dichotomy functions as a framework of populist belief, ultimately, populism
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(especially in discourse) must be identified by the moral argument that accompanies
it.
OVERLAPPING IDEOLOGIES
The presence of overlapping ideologies in Morales' rhetoric is significant for
a number of reasons. First, it is counterintuitive that so few instances of pure
populism exist in Morales' rhetoric during the seven-year period being studied,
especially given his reputation as a stalwart populist. In most of the discourse
samples, Morales' populism goes hand in hand with what are referred to here as
nationalism and socialism: rather than 'cleanly' establishing the people-elite
dichotomy, and making an argument about the values of some (homogenous)
common people, the categories of the people, the elite, and the nature of the moral
argument are often influenced by Morales' underlying socialist and nationalist
leanings. However, rather than crowding out populism, the presence of other
ideologies appears to be complementary (the presence of one does not signal the
demise of another). This, in turn, appears to support 'thin-centered' definitions of
populism.
The presence overlapping ideologies also offers a secondary opportunity to
gauge routinization. If routinization is interpreted at a highly abstract level to signify
the loss of an ideology's 'essence,' which is very much in line with the interpretation
utilized in this thesis, the available data indicates that populism actually underwent
less routinization than socialism and nationalism after Morales took office. Therefore,
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not only has the common values element of populism increased after Morales
assumed the Presidency, but the populist ideology has routinized comparatively less
than others that were also present (at least according to the data gathered for this
thesis). In this way, theories of routinization have been disproved twice over.
LOOKING AT POPULIST POLICY
As this thesis has noted previously, the existence of overlapping ideologies in
Morales' discourse has distinct methodological implications: given the overlap of at
least three ideologies in Morales' discourse, it becomes difficult to attribute any of the
President's actions purely to populism. However, while it would be nearly impossible
to classifY actions as 'populist' or 'non-populist' without linking it to prior discourse,
it might be possible to follow up on specific promises that Morales (or any other
populist) made when his (or her) populist ideology featured particularly strongly in
discourse. At the very least, investigating the outcome of Morales' so-called 'populist
promises' could shed light on the sincerity of his populism (and the ability of
language to reflect it), should these be called into question. The following section will
briefly address the policies and actions of Morales' administration to determine .
whether the President followed through on promises to improve the status quo. More
specifically, it addresses his pledges (or intimations) to lessen foreign influence in the
country, rule for the benefit of the people (rather than to emich himself), make the
distribution of land more equal, and rectify the historical exclusion of indigenous
groups.
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Most would agree that Morales has made an effort to lessen foreign influence
in the country after assuming office; not only has he sought to minimize the presence
of foreign agents in the region, but he has nationalized the country's oil and gas
industry in an effort to divert more revenues towards the Bolivian government.
Shortly after assuming office, Morales nationalized twelve oil and natural gas
companies, increasing the country's state-run oil company's (Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos) stake in such businesses to anywhere between 51 to
99 percent of all shares. After the initial wave of nationalizations in 2006, he
continued to nationalize the remaining oil companies in a more piecemeal fashion
from 2007 to 2009, accusing foreign companies of failing to respect Bolivian
standards and stating that he was reclaiming the country's natural resources.
Ultimately, Morales effectively increased the total amount of revenue being collected
by Bolivia to some 2.5 billion in 2008 (1/21/2009), a significant sum of revenue that
has translated into political CUlTency. Morales has also made an effort to minimize
foreign influence within Bolivian telTitory, particularly in matters involving the
United States: he supported leaders from the Chapare region and the Chuquisaca
department in their efforts to expel the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) after calling the organization an extension of American imperialism, and
balTed the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from performing operations
within Bolivia after accusing the entity's agents of engaging in political espionage.
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Morales also appears to have made good on promises to set his administration
apart from the corruption and excess that is generally understood to have
characterized past governments, cutting his salary by more than 50 percent
immediately after taking office and mandating that no other Cabinet Minister could
collect a higher salary than his own. Morales linked the pay cut directly to the
country's dire need for teachers, stating that the money generated by the salary
reduction would be used to hire 3,800 new teachers (1/27/2006). In other actions that
might be interpreted to demonstrate his will to serve the people's interest, Morales
subjected himself and the country's nine governors to a national recall referendum
that theoretically put his own tenure at risk. (However, he won 67 percent of the vote
and six of the country's nine departments.) He also brought to fruition the first
constitution to ever be voted on in a national referendum, which was approved on 25
January 2009. The constitution, in turn, has reinforced the power of the common
person, endowing the Bolivian people with control of the country's natural resources
and enabling any Bolivian, regardless of ethnicity or education, the ability to begin
legal proceedings in defense of the environment.
More recently, Morales has begun to take steps to rectify what he previously
referred to as an unjust distribution of territory. The country's 2009 Constitution has
also played a large role in this issue, limiting the size of future land sales to 12,355
acres and establishing that private property rights will only be upheld if the land
"meets a social function and does not damage the collective interest" (Machicado).
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Morales has already acted on the new constitution to seize what his administration
deemed underutilized property, confiscating just under 99,000 acres from five
'oligarchic' families located in the Santa Cruz department in February 2009, which he
redistributed one month later to the indigenous Guarani tribe.
Finally, Morales appears to have made goodon promises to rectify the
historical exclusion of indigenous peoples, pushing through the creation of a
constitution that created a separate legal system for Bolivia's indigenous population
and quota for indigenous representation in government. Following the approval of the
new constitution, Morales restructured his Cabinet to give it a more "plurinational"
character, replacing at least five of his former Ministers with mostly indigenous
representatives and created a Ministry of Culture, partly to preserve indigenous
heritage.
While the above policies and actions indicate that Morales has made good on
many of the 'populist promises' that feature heavily in his discourse, it should be
noted that not all of these achievements were attained democratically. Take, for
example, the new constitution. Despite it's socially-progressive content, the document
was created without the involvement of opposition senators, approved despite being
rejected in four of the country's nine departments, and forced through the Senate by
Morales, who embarked on a widely-publicized hunger strike in order to pressure
opposition politicians into approving his terms for new elections in December 2009.
Morales has also engaged in some actions as President that could be said to directly
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challenge democratic principals, declaring a state of martial law in the Pando
department in September 2008 and placing its (opposition) governor under indefinite
arrest following fatal clashes between mostly indigenous pro-government supporters
and opposition protestors.
Ultimately, Morales has followed through on many of the implicit and explicit
promises that characterized his populist rhetoric during the two periods analyzed for
this thesis. Whether his occasionally undemocratic actions serve to undercut his
populist ideology is a decision that will be left to the reader.
FUTURE RESEARCH
A second analysis of another (allegedly) populist leader would greatly
strengthen the conclusions of this thesis by lessening the chances that Bolivia
somehow functions as an errant case. The inclusion of another detailed case study
would not only appease positivist scholars of political science, who maintain that "a
single observation is not a useful technique for testing hypotheses or theories" (King,
Keohane and Verba, 211Y2 but also some interpretivists. As Eckstein states:
Conceivably, the most powerful study of all for theory
building is neither the presently common form of
comparative study (of cases studied randomly, or
intuitively selected, or studied because they seem
readily available or accessible) nor the study of single
crucial cases, but, so to speak, "comparative crucial
case studies. (Eckstein, 127)
12 Though admittedly, these authors tend to be addressing theories of causality.
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The presence of two crucial case studies might also generate new hypotheses
concerning ideological overlap and help determine whether references to 'the people'
are being over determined as populism, as this author suspects. Given the limited
nature of this study, an exact replica of the above study could also be repeated using
a more comprehensive sample of Morales' discourse to bolster the accuracy of its
conclusions.
Finally, this author wishes to stress the importance offuture scholarship
studying populism from the ground up. If populism is defined as an ideology, it can
logically be adopted by state leaders, so-called 'peasants', social groups, and political
movements: populism can be both top-down (government) and bottom-up (common
people). Coniff, in particular, discusses the importance of studying populist
perspectives of everyday people. As he states, "[r]esearch from the bottom up might
be especially fruitful, surveying popular culture ... and anchoring it with oral history"
(Conniff, 243). Given that populism is constructed in favor of 'the people,' more
studies should attempt to incorporate an investigation of populism at the mass level;
such an investigation would undoubtedly prove rewarding.
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